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Abstract 
 
This paper estimates the impact of the ongoing housing bust and oil price boom on 
the US and European economies. It finds that large house price movements 
(changes in construction investment) are useful to predict exceptionally bad and 
good times for the US economy, but not for most large European countries. In 
Europe housing market developments have led to extreme values of GDP, mainly in 
the UK, Spain and some Nordic countries. 
Exceptionally good or bad times are defined as realisations of the output gap (the 
difference between actual and trend GDP) that fall in the 5% tail of the distribution. 
Our definition of a ‘bad time’ thus does not necessarily imply a recession, which is 
officially defined as two consecutive quarters of falling GDP (and employment). A 
prolonged period of sub par growth could also lead to an equivalent output gap. 
Our model allows us to estimate the probability of the US and European economies 
experiencing exceptionally bad times. We find that the probability for the US is over 
50% if one assumes that house prices will continue to fall throughout 2008. Adding 
the high oil price to the picture increases this probability to over 80%. 
For most European countries we find a much lower probability; except for Spain, 
where the probability of a large output gap will rise to over 85 % by the end of 2008 
if house prices were to fall as much as in the US.  
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THE US HOUSING BUST AND SOARING OIL PRICES: 
WHAT NEXT FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY? 
CEPS WORKING DOCUMENT NO. 294/JUNE 2008 
CECILIA FRALE & DANIEL GROS
* 
Introduction 
The acute phase of the financial market problems that started in the summer of 2007 now seems 
to be coming to an end. This is the right time to focus once more on the fundamentals that 
caused the crisis in the first place. The key factor that drove the build-up of the imbalances that 
subsequently gave rise to the crisis was obviously the boom (and now bust) in housing markets, 
mostly in the US, but also in a number of other countries. It has now been amply documented 
(IMF, 2008; Gros, 2006, 2007) that house prices had risen a long way above longer term trends 
in most industrialised countries (except Germany and Japan).  
There can be little doubt that increasing house prices fuelled growth up until about 2007. As 
house prices are now falling almost everywhere the question arises as to whether the bust in 
housing will also lead to a bust in the wider economy. One purpose of this paper is to test the 
likelihood of this scenario. 
Falling house prices are not the only factor influencing growth prospects in the US and Europe. 
Another rapidly developing threat to growth comes from the seemingly inexorable increase in 
oil prices, which in real terms are now close to the levels last seen during the oil crises of 1973 
and 1981. The last two occasions oil prices spiked, the world economy experienced a recession 
so the question arises as to whether the current level of oil prices is also likely to have a strong 
negative impact on growth. It is often argued that the present run up in oil prices is different 
because it is not due to a disruption of supply, but rather a strong growth in demand from 
emerging market economies. However, for industrialised countries like the US and Europe, it 
does not really matter whether the supply of crude oil that is available to them falls because 
OPEC decides to lower output (as in 1973 and 1981) or whether the available supply is 
increasingly going to other countries (EMEs, mainly China). 
Moreover, the data suggests that oil (and in general commodity) prices tend to move together 
with house prices (in industrialised countries). The peak of crude oil prices in both 1973 and 
1981 coincided in both cases with a sharp turning point for house prices (at least in the US): 
before the peak in oil prices they were increasing, but fell thereafter. This is not surprising, since 
higher oil prices lower the purchasing power of consumers in industrialised countries, which 
should lead to decreased demand for non-tradables, such as housing. 
Industrialised countries are thus currently facing a triple shock: an increase in the risk premium 
because of financial market stress, a fall in house prices and deterioration in terms of trade due 
to higher commodity prices. While monetary policy seems to have some success in alleviating 
the first it remains to be seen how the remaining two risk factors will impact on the US and 
European economies. 
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The recent mortgage crisis in the US has reignited the debate about the link between the housing 
market and the business cycle. Despite a general consensus that asset prices affect the real 
economy through several channels, such as wealth effect, financial accelerator and investment 
Tobin’s Q, there is no general consensus on why this is the case. In particular, as the last WEO 
report from the IMF pointed out, in spite of a general consensus about the importance of the 
housing sector for the economic activity, it is not clear overall how and in what measure 
residential investments affect the business cycle, nor how house prices influence consumer 
spending. Quite surprisingly, the IMF recognises the central role of house price inflation in 
economic stabilisation through monetary policies, especially in countries with developed 
mortgage markets. 
We perform an empirical analysis in this paper of the likelihood of good/bad times arising from 
large swings in both the real estate sector and the price of crude oil. This analysis then allows us 
to answer the question: “how likely is it that the US (or the European) economy will experience 
a significant fall in output given that house prices are now falling rapidly and given that oil 
prices are reaching record levels?” We prefer this way of putting the issue to the more usual 
question: “can the US avoid a recession?” because a prolonged period of sub par growth (which 
technically would not constitute a recession) could lead to a loss of output as large as, or 
potentially even larger than, a sharp, but short contraction of output (which would qualify as a 
recession). We define a ‘bad time’ of output as a situation whereby actual output is below 
potential by an amount that is so large that its probability of happening is only 5%. 
We find that, for the US, house prices (and residential investment) do have a strong impact on 
the likelihood of extreme deviations of GDP from potential. By contrast, in Europe this is not 
generally the case. Within Europe house prices are significant for predicting large output losses 
only in Scandinavia, the UK and Spain. 
Our estimates suggest that given the present rate of decline in house prices in the US and given 
that oil prices are close to US$100 /barrel, the likelihood of a ‘bad time’ for the US GDP is 
close to 80%. This is not necessarily a prediction of a recession in the US as our measure refers 
to output relative to potential. If growth in the US were to continue at below 1% (p.a. which was 
the pace during Q1 2008) the US would still experience an output gap early next year of close to 
-2% of GDP, which would constitute a ‘bad time’. See Figure 1.  
Housing markets and bad times 
This paper aims to investigate the interrelationship, if any, between the housing market and the 
business cycle, by answering the following research question: do large swings in both the real 
estate sector and crude oil price lead to extreme events in GDP
1?  
We make use of a definition of GDP bad/good times that mainly corresponds to an output gap 
above (or below) 2%, which gave rise to numerous events in the period before mid-1980s, but 
not afterwards (see Box 1. for some details on the ‘great moderation’). 
 
 
 
                                                      
1 In addition to GDP we have investigated the link between the housing market and employment, 
unfortunately without relevant results. This is probably related to two empirical issues: first of all the 
employment cycle lags with respect to the GDP cycle, and secondly the response of employment to 
negative/positive shocks in the real estate market is not stable in terms of time reaction and amplitude. THE US HOUSING BUST: WHAT NEXT FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY? | 3 
 
Figure 1. Historical GDP bad/good times in the US 
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Note: Good/bad times in GDP are defined using an indicator variable that takes values: -1=GDP in left 
5% tail of the distribution, 1=GDP in right 5% tail, 0 otherwise. 
Source:  ISF statistics and own calculations. 
 
 
 
 
Box 1. The effect of great moderation 
There exists a broad consensus that most macroeconomic time series have become less volatile in 
the last 20 years in the US and GDP is among them. This phenomenon, commonly known as the 
‘great moderation’, has been widely investigated in the literature with the aim of finding the main 
drivers that produced this sort of general reduction in volatility. Although there is not full 
agreement about the exact starting point in time of the great moderation, 1984 is commonly 
recognised as the year marking this change. 
As a matter of fact, Figure 1 produces clear evidence of a break in the amplitude of the cycle of 
GDP in US in the mid-1980s, which is confirmed by observing that its sample standard deviation 
in the last 20 years dropped to 60% of the variation in the total sample. 
There is no doubt that the definition of ‘good/bad times’ used in the econometric analysis is 
affected by changing volatility in time; nevertheless we show in the following that the main 
conclusion about the predictive power of real estate market developments for the business cycle 
is not invalidated when the ‘great moderation’ is accounted for. 
A simple way to take account of the reduced volatility is by computing the ‘bad/good times’ after 
the mid-1980s according to the distribution of GDP in the restricted sample for the period 1985-
2007. This has the effect of increasing the number of extreme events, as shown by Figure 2. 4 | FRALE & GROS 
 
 
Box 1. cont. 
Figure 2. Housing market and GDP good/bad times in the US considering the great moderation 
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Note: The dark grey (light green) vertical shaded areas correspond to periods of GDP in 5% left 
(right) tail of its distribution. 
Hence, by using this definition accounting for the great moderation effect, we re-estimate the 
model for the probability that the real estate market determines the business cycle good/bad 
times. As before, we also include the crude oil price in the estimation and we allow for lags. 
Estimated results are reported in Table 1. See below for the basic equation and for a fuller 
version of the model where the crude oil price is entered contemporaneously with the other 
variables before 1985 and lagged afterwards.  
Table 1. Ordered probit estimates for good/bad times in US accounting for the great moderation 
effect 
Model 1  Coefficient  Prob. 
Investment in housing  7.05  0.0000 
House prices  13.15  0.0523 
Oil prices relative to GDP per capita (-5)  0.00  0.0363 
Model 2  Coefficient  Prob. 
Investment in housing  6.51  0.0002 
House prices  14.92  0.0295 
Oil prices relative to GDP per capita (-5)*I(1985-2007)  0.00  0.055 
Oil prices relative to GDP per capita*I(1970-1984)  0.00  0.0867 
Note: The dependent variable assumes value as -1, 0,1 as for GDP in the left 5%, central 90%, right 5% of 
the distribution respectively. 
After 1985 the tails are computed considering the restricted sample 1985-2007 
Prob. is the p-value and should be compared with the standard 0.05 
Oil price (-5) indicates that the variable enters with a lag of 5 quarters in the model. 
I(1985-2007) is the indicator function for the period 1985-2007 and similarly I(1970-1984) 
Regardless of the model chosen, the simplest or the more detailed, the main conclusion is that the 
real estate market significantly determines the probability of good/bad times for GDP in US. 
Moreover, the estimated probabilities of a bad time for the fourth quarter of 2008, assuming the 
same trend for the indicators as before, are respectively: 31%, 34%, 48% and 68% with the 
simplest model and 32%, 37%, 53% and 73% if the fuller formalisation is used.  
The bottom line of this robustness check is that the great moderation argument does not affect 
our results on the impact of the housing market on the business cycle. THE US HOUSING BUST: WHAT NEXT FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY? | 5 
 
It is useful to start with a visual examination of the data, as shown by Figure 3, where we plot 
the quarterly detrended
2 housing price and investments in the residential market in the US from 
1970 to 2007. Situations of good/bad times correspond to shaded green/grey areas.  
Figure 3. Housing market and GDP good/bad times (5% tail) in the US 
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Note: The dark grey (light green) vertical shaded areas correspond to periods when GDP falls in the 5% 
left (right) tail of its distribution. This graphical framework is used for similar plots henceforth. 
Source: Real GDP is taken from ISF statistics; housing prices come from the AMECO database and 
investments in the residential sector are taken from the US NIPA and Eurostat National 
Accounts. 
The visual coherence between shaded areas and the housing market cycle, at least for the period 
before mid-1980s, is quite strong. The same experiment, with a wider definition of good/bad 
times (e.g. 10% tail) confirms this impression for recent years (Figure 4).  
Figure 4. Housing market and GDP good/bad times (10% tail) in the US 
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2 All data are seasonally adjusted and detrended by using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. As we are aware of 
the limitations of this tool, we leave the application of more complex filters for future discussions. 6 | FRALE & GROS 
 
Moreover, a change in the dynamics is visible in the 1980s: in spite of a high degree of 
synchronisation and high amplitude of the cycle in house prices and residential investments up 
in the mid-1980s, over the last 30 years the coherence of the two series is much smaller, as is 
their variance. 
If we draw the same graph for EU countries, the picture emerging is not as clear as for the US, 
although for a group of Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland and Sweden) we still observe some 
coherence between housing prices and GDP good/bad times.  
Figure 5. Housing market and GDP good/bad times (5% tail) in Europe 
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The graphical evidence suggested by Figures 3 and 5 could be reinforced by a more formal 
analysis, e.g. estimating an econometric model for the probability of good/bad times in GDP, 
conditional on the real estate market (house prices
3 and investments in the residential sector). 
The model can be as complicated as we wish, adding dynamics and additional variables, but we 
have opted for simplicity.  
For every country under consideration we developed an ordered probit model defined as 
follows: 
t t t t investment housprice y ε β α + + =  
where the dependent variable yt aims at capturing outliers in the GDP cycle and is defined as 
follows:  
                                                      
3 As a benchmark we estimate the same model for the US by using the S&P/Case-Shiller US National 
Home Price Index. Unfortunately this index is available from 1987 and does not include the two market 
crises of 1973 and 1981. The econometric analysis is then invalidated because of the limited number of 
events in the dependent variable. 
Box 2. On the interpretation of the detrended series 
It might be worth clarifying that in order to avoid any misinterpretation of the cycle dynamic, as 
plotted in Figures 1-5, we should bear in mind the level of its trend.  
Consider the case of Spain, for example for which we report the housing prices along with the 
GDP trend: in Figure 6 the recent cycle slowdown is a result of an incredibly steep trend in the 
previous 20 years.  
Figure 6. Housing prices and their trend in Spain 
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The steep decline in the cycle visible in former figures should therefore be viewed in the light of 
this consideration. 8 | FRALE & GROS 
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where τ5 and τ95 are the 5
th and 95
th quartile of the distribution of the detrended GDP (and 
similarly for the 10
th and 90
th quartiles). 
The two explanatory variables are house prices and investment in construction expressed as a 
deviation from the trend, as shown by former Figures. A standard error term  t ε  completes the 
model. 
Table 2. Cross section ordered probit estimates for GDP good/bad times 
   GDP in 5% extreme tails  GDP in 10% extreme tails 
Sample Country  House 
prices    Investment 
in housing    House 
prices    Investment 
in housing   
                     
1970Q1:2007Q3 US  17.04 **  16.25 **  0.36 **  7.94 ** 
1988Q2:2003Q1 SWE  0.25 **  0.01     0.20 **  0.01  
1972Q1:2007Q3 DNK  0.12 **  0.01     0.10 **  0.01  
1975Q1:2007Q4 FIN  0.31 **  0.01     0.20 **  -0.02  
1980Q1:2007Q4 ES  0.06 *  0.06     0.07 **  0.18 ** 
1978Q1:2007Q4 FR  0.02   0.21 **  0.06   0.22 ** 
1980Q1:2007Q3 IT  -0.01   0.09     -0.01   0.08  
1989Q4  2007Q4 UK  0.09 **  0.06 **  0.12 **  0.08 ** 
1991Q1:2007Q4 DE  0.23   0.19 **  0.24   0.21 ** 
** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level. 
Estimated results, reported in the previous table, show that in the US the probability of good/bad 
times in GDP (with the definition based on a 5% tail and a 10% as well) is driven by both house 
prices and investments in the residential market.  
As for the Scandinavian countries, house prices are still relevant for GDP good/bad times, while 
investments are not. On the contrary, for the other European countries, the probit regression 
suggests that (at least in the past) the real estate market did not have a significant impact in 
leading to extreme GDP events, except for in the UK and partially for Spain. 
This result is not surprising since Spain and the UK are the two countries in Europe with the 
biggest variation in housing prices (twice the average variation of EU countries for Spain and 
1.5 times for the UK, as shown by Figure 7). Moreover, these two countries also have more 
developed mortgage markets, which should increase the impact of house prices on consumption 
(and investment) as shown in IMF (WEO 2008) and Muellbauer (2008). THE US HOUSING BUST: WHAT NEXT FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY? | 9 
 
Figure 7. Sample mean and standard deviation of house prices in different countries 
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Note: The comparison between countries should be carried out with caution because of the different 
sample size of the data in different countries, as reported in the first column of Table 1. 
Implications: The likelihood of good/bad times 
Based on these results, the question that arises is: what is the probability of a bad time in the 
near future? Our model can provide an answer to this. Starting from a baseline hypothesis that 
projects the recent trend of the two indicators 1 year on, namely a constant yearly decrease of 
house prices by 5% and a monthly slowdown of investments by 2%, we obtain the estimated 
probabilities for the US as shown in Figure 8. In particular, for the four quarters of 2008, the 
estimated probabilities of a bad time in the US correspond to: 8%; 9%; 22%; 56%.  
Thus for the end of 2008 we have a probability bigger than 50% of seeing the US GDP being 
strongly below its trend; a fact that has not occurred since the 1980s. 
Figure 8. Estimated probability of a bad time (5% left tail) in the US 
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As far as European countries are concerned, we do not have empirical evidence of a significant 
relationship between the business cycle and the housing market, except for the UK and Spain 
(only a 10% tail).  
It is widely expected that Spain will experience a housing bust at least as strong as that of the 
US given that prices there have increased even more than in the US and investment in 
construction has reached a level that far exceeds the American one as well (see Gros, 2007). 
However, using actual data until up to the end of 2007, when the housing sector was not yet in 
full decline, the probability remained below 30%. 
The estimated parameters imply that for Spain the probability that the country will fall on a bad 
time increases substantially during 2008, when we might assume a decline in investment and 
house prices as deep as in the US. The associate probabilities increase substantially over the 
four quarters of 2008: going from 5% to over 85% at the end of the year. 
The same probabilities for the UK never exceed 5%. 
Figure 9. Estimated probability of a bad time (10% left tail) in Spain 
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Figure 10. Estimated probability of a bad time (5% left tail) in UK 
UK
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In other words, the probability of a slowdown in the Spanish economy is still likely even if not 
so evident as in the US, while the UK does not seem to be at risk.  
Risk factor II: The impact of crude oil prices  
There is one missing factor in the picture we have drawn up to now: oil prices, which have 
beaten all records so far in 2008. The experience of two big recessions driven by spikes in the 
oil price (1973 and 1981) suggests that the present level of oil prices might also have a strong 
impact on growth. 
But which metric provides the best measurement of the potential impact of crude prices on the 
economy? The best way to measure the impact of oil prices on the purchasing power of 
importing countries should be the relationship between the price of a barrel of oil and GDP per 
capita. The number of barrels one year of GPD (per capita) can buy gives an idea of the ‘tax’ oil 
imposes on OECD economies. 
As Figure 11. shows, at the beginning of the 70’s one year GDP (per capita) in the US allowed 
the purchase in the US of 1,500 barrels of oil, while after the petrol price rise in the following 
years the purchasing power decreased rapidly to 500 barrels, as the oil price increased more than 
the (nominal) GDP. 
Figure 11.a. Purchasing power as ratio between GDP per capita and oil price - US 
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Figure 11.b. Purchasing power as ratio between GDP per capita and oil price- Europe 
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The second oil shock was followed by a long period of recovery in ‘oil purchasing power’. But 
at the May 2008 level of oil prices the situation is again similar to that of that of the 1970s, in 
both the US and in Europe. 
More precise features are provided in Table 3 where the actual amount of purchasable barrels in 
2007 and the two minima reached in the sample, 1974 and 1979, are displayed. Consumer 
purchasing power is nowadays still around 400 barrels, still far from historical lows, but if the 
crude oil price continues to grow at the current speed, the purchasing power in the US in mid-
2008 will be down to the level of the 1970s. 
Table 3. GDP pro capita/oil price: last published value and the two historical minima 
   US DK  FIN FR  DEU IT  SWE  UK ES 
             
1974Q1  353    191 241 450  91    149  86 
1979Q4  195 146 117 141 175  73  130 110  66 
2007Q4  454 394 403 392 356 391 395 438 404 
Standard  deviation    448 379 370 388 535 422 385 387 412 
Note: The sample starts from 1997Q1 for Denmark, from 1980Q1 for Sweden, and from 1970Q1 for all the 
others countries. 
If we look at the oil prices dynamic compared to house prices, as shown in Figure 12., we notice 
that the two peaks of oil prices in the 1970s correspond to a decline in house prices, although 
with some delay and a sticky dynamic. It is possible that the price-rush was perceived by 
households as a sign of recession that might eventually have led to a weak demand for durable 
goods, including houses.  THE US HOUSING BUST: WHAT NEXT FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY? | 13 
 
The situation is different for the 1980s period and beginning of the 1990s, where the co-
movement of the two indicators could not be detected clearly. The oil and real estate markets 
are moving in completely opposite directions in the new millennium, maybe as a result of the 
housing bubble.  
Figure 12. Co-movement of housing prices and purchasing power - US 
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This feature is reproduced in some European countries (Germany, Spain, the UK and Finland) 
where the two slowdowns in purchasing power in the 1970s are mirrored in the housing market, 
while in some other countries (Italy, France, Denmark and Sweden) the picture is more 
confused. 
Figure 13. Co-movement of housing prices and purchasing power -Europe 
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Figure 13 cont. Co-movement of housing prices and purchasing power –Europe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Ordered probit estimates for good/bad times  
   GDP in 5% extreme tails  GDP in 10% extreme tails 
Sample Country  House 
prices    Investment
in housing  
Oil 
purchasing 
power 
  House
prices    Investment 
in housing   
Oil 
purchasing 
power 
  
                               
1970Q1:2007Q3  US  50.75 **  15.139 ** 0.00122  * 40.186 ** 7.794 **  0.00018   
1988Q2:2003Q1  SWE  0.28 **  0.003   0.00134    0.214 ** 0.009   0.00064   
19772Q1:2007Q2 DNK  0.12 **  0.015   -0.00012    0.105 ** 0.010   -0.00026   
1975Q1:2007Q3  FIN  0.35 **  -0.005    -0.00135    0.205 ** -0.030    -0.00038   
1980Q1:2007Q3 ES  0.09  **  0.074   -0.00132 ** 0.091 ** 0.198  **  -0.00114 **
1978Q1:2007Q2  FR  0.02   0.211 ** -0.00027    0.048   0.217 **  -0.00033   
1980Q1:2007Q3 IT  0.00    0.088   0.00014    -0.001   0.081   0.00028   
1989Q4 2007Q3  UK  0.09 **  0.057 ** 0.00033    0.131 ** 0.083 **  0.00021   
1991Q1:2006Q4  DE  0.28    0.171    0.00094    0.273    0.201 **  0.00072   
** Significant at the 5% level.* Significant at the 10%. level.  
Note: Oil purchasing power is defined as the ratio between GDP per capita and the oil price.  
 
Including oil prices in our econometric model
4, we find that crude oil prices seem to lead to 
good/bad times in the US (when we look at strong negative values (5% tail), while the 
probability of a mild decrease (10 % tail) does not seem to be linked to oil prices (see Table 4).  
                                                      
4 We also estimate as a robustness check a model with only oil prices as the explanatory variable. Results 
are coherent with those reported in the text.  
Denmark 
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Housing prices (log)
Purchasing power in barrels of oil
Finland 
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Housing prices (log)
Purchasing power in barrels of oil
 
Sweden 
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Housing prices (log)
Purchasing power in barrels of oil
 THE US HOUSING BUST: WHAT NEXT FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY? | 15 
 
For most European economies there is no significant evidence of oil price impact on extreme 
GDP outcomes. One reason for this might be that the oil producing countries (essentially the 
Gulf countries plus Russia) import much more from Europe than from the US. In 2006 imports 
to the Gulf region from the US amounted to $45 billion, against imports from the EU of around 
$130 billion. Germany’s exports, for example, only to the Gulf and Russia were at $60 billion 
higher than those of the US ($47 billion). For most EU countries exports to oil producing 
countries thus provide a cushion that mitigates the impact of higher oil prices on GDP growth.  
Another reason why the US should be more affected by changes in crude oil prices is that the 
US economy is much more energy intensive, and in particular more oil intensive than Europe. 
The US and the eurozone have a very similar overall GDP (at current prices $8,887 and 
$13,841, respectively), but the US consumes about 75% more oil than the eurozone countries 
together (940 million tons in the US against about 550 million tons for the eurozone). This 
means that productivity of energy use in eurozone is more than twice as high as in the US, i.e. 
$25,000 per ton in the former versus only $9,500 in the US.  
Finally there is another reason why oil matters in the US-estimates and not in those for Europe: 
the price of oil in euro is much less variable than the price in USD. Over the last five years the 
price per barrel has roughly doubled in euro terms (from around €35/barrel to over €70/barrel), 
but it has increased by over four times in US terms (from around $25/barrel to $130/barrel).    
If we compute, as above, the estimated probabilities of a bad time in the US also including 
crude oil prices with a conservative hypothesis of constant purchasing power, we get a 75% 
probability of an extreme negative GDP. When we factor in the more likely hypothesis of a 
decrease in the purchasing power of USD GDP per capita in terms of oil (going down to 400 
barrels for the whole of 2008), the same probability reaches 82%. Furthermore, when we 
include the latest oil prices we end up with an 85% probability of a bad time by the end of 2008. 
As for Spain, the only European country with slightly significant empirical evidence, the 
estimated probability of a bad time adding the crude oil dynamic does not change dramatically 
in 2008. 
As a final argument, it might be worth considering which GDP growth profile for 2008 will 
bring the US into a bad time scenario. If the trend continues to increase at the average rate of 
last year, the US economy will enter the bad time in 2009, if the yearly growth never exceeds 
1% in 2008. 
In conclusion, while a recession for the US now appears imminent, this is not the case for 
Europe. The last recession in 2001 was an adjustment to a classic investment cycle in 
equipment, which was common to almost all countries. The present cycle is driven by 
investment in construction, which has different amplitude and a different impact in Europe and 
in the US, as our econometric results have shown.  
We envisage the high probability of a partial decoupling. 
Conclusions 
It is now apparent that wide swings in the housing market affect the economy and can lead to 
‘extreme’ or ‘exceptional’ realisations of GDP (relative to trend). Instead of considering the 
classic definition of recession, we use a neutral statistical definition of good/bad times for GDP, 
namely events in the extreme tails (5% and 10%) of the distribution of the output gap (actual 
minus trend GDP).  
Due to the ‘great moderation’ (i.e. the reduced volatility in GDP in the last two decades) we 
naturally find in the historical analysis that this type of event is concentrated in the 1970s and 16 | FRALE & GROS 
 
1980s. But we find that an ongoing bust in the housing markets might lead to a return of a 
higher variability in the output gap. 
Starting from the observation that there is visible evidence of co-movement in housing market 
cycle and output outliers, we estimate a model for the probability that changes in house prices 
and residential investments lead to good/bad times (extreme output gap events). 
We find evidence that the housing cycle leads to GDP extreme events in the US while for most 
large European countries this is not the case, except for the UK, and, partially for Spain.  
Based on the estimated parameters we compute the probability that the ongoing fall in house 
prices and residential investment in the US leads to an exceptional output gap there. We find 
that for the US the probability of an exceptional output gap is around 50% based on current data 
for the housing bust. For Europe, only for Spain do we find a significant probability of a bad 
time materialising next year. The probability would remain low, lower than 30% if the housing 
market continues along the relatively smooth path experienced until the end of 2007. However, 
if we assume for Spain a similar development to that of the US (in terms of house prices and 
residential investment) the probability of Spain falling on hard times increases to over 85% by 
the end of 2008. 
Given that the two major downturns in the 1970s and 1980s were associated with spikes in the 
crude oil prices, we include it in our model. In particular we consider the purchasing power of 
consumers in terms of numbers of purchasable oil barrels, or the ratio between nominal GDP 
per capita and the oil price. 
As before, the oil price seems to matter for the US, while for Europe the relationship is not 
significant, except (again) for Spain. The probability of having a large output gap developing 
reaches 82% in the US if one puts oil prices as of the end of 2007 into the model (and would 
increase further depending on the current, May 2008, level of prices). For Spain adding the oil 
price does not lead to a significant increment of the probabilities computed before. The much 
reduced impact of oil on European economies is not surprising in light of the fact that European 
exports to oil-exporting countries are much larger than those of the US. 
The main conclusion is that it is highly likely that a large output gap will develop in the US, 
even if it can technically avoid a recession. The results also suggest at least that a partial 
decoupling should be expected since in Europe (with the exception of Spain) neither the 
housing markets nor the price of oil play the same role as in the US.  
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